



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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY



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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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[REDACTED]

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(Page 6)
4. USSR: Plenary meeting of party central committee  
to be held late this month. (Page 7)

[REDACTED]

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
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
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## INDIA-PAKISTAN Order of Battle

( ) Line of confrontation      ← Thrust movement      ~ Link-up



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India-Pakistan: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

The military situation remains unclear, but India claims its forces have "achieved their objectives" in the Sialkot area.

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India also claims to have stopped a Pakistani attack south of Lahore. [redacted]

[redacted] Pakistan is moving forces from Lahore to the Sialkot area, and may be contemplating a counter-attack there. India has reportedly moved additional forces to the western front, including a brigade from Madras in southern India, and half a division from the East Pakistan border.]

Both nations continue to claim success for their aid raids and deny enemy claims. Indian planes attacked Peshawar early yesterday, and Pakistan attacked airbases including Barrakpore north of Calcutta. The embassy in New Delhi is concerned that further raids from East Pakistan--such as the attack on Barrakpore--could lead to Indian retaliation.

[The US Defense Attache in Karachi reports that the Pakistani supply and equipment problem may become serious enough to endanger the Pakistani war effort. Both the attache and the ambassador warn that a worsening military situation could force Pakistan to turn to Peking for help.]

\* Just  
Before leaving New Delhi he proposed a cease-fire to take effect on 16 September. The new proposal stipulates the cease-fire would be for eight days during which the secretary general would attempt to work out further provisions acceptable to both sides.

of a future Kashmir settlement would be nothing more than a return to a situation they believe has been to India's advantage.

[redacted]  
army requirements and transportation difficulties will

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(continued)

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[redacted]  
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prevent food shipments to West Bengal for at least three weeks. Although there is now about a four weeks' supply on hand, food grain rations may be reduced soon, and any prolonged interruption of supplies could lead to serious popular disorders.]

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Indonesia: Anti-American activity is again on the increase, and further pressures against non-Communist Indonesians have developed.

25X1 [redacted] the Communist youth front is preparing for another major demonstration against the US Embassy in Djakarta. Further action is also planned against the consulates in Surabaya and Medan, both the targets of repeated demonstrations.

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The Communist aim is to bring about a break in US-Indonesian relations. Other political groups, apparently feeling compelled to prove themselves to Sukarno as revolutionaries have joined the anti-US effort. Moslem groups, demonstrating at the US consulate in Surabaya on 13 September, urged the government to close all US activities, seize American property, and send home all Americans.

Sukarno continues to accuse the US of subversive plots. In a recent speech he claimed that Indonesia had become neocolonialism's "main target in Asia." Two Americans, a missionary formerly stationed in West Irian and a Pan American employee, are being held and interrogated. One is charged with helping West Irian rebels, the other with insulting the Indonesian Government.

A major campaign also appears to be developing against Indonesia's political moderates. Sukarno recently ordered police "to expunge hypocrites, foot draggers, false elements, and deviators in every field." He warned the heads of the police and the armed forces to "integrate with the people." Various military and civilian officials have taken the hint and denounced the few recent anti-Communist activities and have committed themselves to a major purge. Action has already been taken against some non-Communist elements in the press and political parties.

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USSR: A plenary meeting of the party central committee apparently will be held at the end of this month.

While there is still no official announcement, the US Embassy in Moscow has learned from three sources, two of them Soviet, that the plenum finally will convene on 27 September. This would allow time for the central committee to complete its business before the Supreme Soviet session scheduled for 1 October.

The plenum seems to have been repeatedly delayed, which suggests that the leadership may have been undecided on what subjects to discuss, or unable to agree on how to deal with them.

One of the main tasks of the plenum will probably be to reorganize industrial management along more centralized lines, perhaps replacing or substantially modifying the sovnarkhoz system created by Khrushchev in 1957. The plenum reportedly will also discuss greater use of the profit motive as an incentive to production.

Personnel changes are likely in connection with a reorganization of industrial management, and these could result in some shift in responsibilities and functions in the top leadership. Rumors of prospective changes at this level have been circulating for some time, but there is still no firm evidence to support them.

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The Department of State

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The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

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The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

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Chief of Staff, United States Army

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U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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